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COVERAGE UNDER THE LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS 
COMPENSATION ACT 
A Claimant under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act claims 
coverage as a maritime worker when injured working in a clerical position not 
covered by the Act on the basis of his "status" as a maritime worker because he 
regularly engaged in covered maritime employment. 
Maher Terminals, Inc. v Dir., Office of Workers' Compensation Programs 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
330 F.3d 162 
(Decided May 29, 2003) 
Respondent employee, Vincent Riggio, made a claim for compensation benefits 
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.S. § 901 (the 
"Act") after injuring his left ann on February 3, 1994. The dispute between respondent 
and petitioner employer, Maher Terminals, Inc. ("Maher") arose when Maher asserted 
that respondent was not covered under the Act because at the time of the injury 
Respondent was not a maritime employee. Respondent was injured when he fell off a 
chair during the course of some clerical work he was performing in an office of Maher's 
port facilities in Elizabeth, New Jersey. 
The first administrative judge held that since respondent was employed as a 
delivery clerk and said position was excluded from coverage under the Act, ("individuals 
employed exclusively to perform office clerical, secretarial, security, or data processing 
work" shall not be considered maritime employees covered by the Act) Respondent was 
not covered under the act. The Benefits Review Board vacated the administrative judges 
decision because respondent was not employed "exclusively" as a clerk within the 
meaning of §902(3)(A). The case was remanded back to an administrative judge who 
applied a "same day of injury" test. On remand it was held that respondent would have 
been covered by the Act if he were subject to reassignment to a maritime position in the 
course of the day the injury occurred. Absent any evidence that respondent was to be 
reassigned that day, coverage under the Act was denied. On appeal back to the Board the 
"same day of injury" test was rejected and a new test was applied. Instead of the looking 
exclusively to the day of the injury, the test was expanded to cover Respondent because 
"he was assigned to work as a checker" (a maritime position covered by the Act) for 
Maher on occasion. Although respondent did not work in that capacity on the day of the 
injury or even the preceding weeks leading up to the injury, to get coverage it was 
enough that he was subject to assignment as a checker at the time of the injury. 
Maher filed a petition to review the Board's decision to determine if the Board's 
interpretation of the Act was "reasonable". 
I .  Coverage 
A. Description of Coverage Test 
15 
The Third Circuit applied the test used in Sea-Land Serv. , Inc. v. Rock, 953 F.2d 
56 (3rd Cir. 1 992). They applied a two-part test looking to the "situs" of the injury and 
the "status" of the injured in determining eligibility under the Act. The "situs" factor is 
broad because it covers not only injuries that occur on water, but also include areas on 
land that are connected to maritime activity. Since the "situs" part is so broad the second 
prong limits the "status" of the injured to be one who is "engaged in maritime 
employment." 33 U.S.C. §902(3). It has been determined that checkers are covered 
under the act as "maritime employees" because they are directly involved in loading or 
unloading functions of cargo. 
The Third Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court's holding in Northeast 
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 ( 1 977), to distinguish between persons 
"involved in essential elements of unloading a vessel" and those that are on site, "but are 
not engaged in the overall process of loading and unloading vessels." !d. at 267. The 
Supreme Court looked to Congress' intent in passing the 1 972 amendments to the Act, 
which was to ensure longshoremen were covered for all of their activity. Although the 
coverage of the Act has significantly been expanded through the implementation of the 
amendments, the Third Circuit limited the scope of coverage in Rock. In Rock an 
employee voluntarily stopped working as a longshoreman and chose to work solely as a 
driver. The employee worked as a driver for two years prior to the accident; applying the 
Supreme Court's  interpretation of the Act from Caputo, the Third Circuit held a van 
driver is not "as essential element or ingredient of the loading or unloading process." 
Rock, 953 F.2d at 67. The issue of whether or not this employee would be reassigned to a 
position covered by the Act, thus gaining coverage for the time while he was not working 
in a maritime position, was declined because he voluntarily chose to avoid the dangers 
associated with being a longshoreman. The holding of Caputo is meant to protect 
employees who are in and out of coverage under the Act throughout their employment, 
not for employees occasionally subject to reassignment. !d. at 67. 
B. Application of Coverage Test 
The dispute between respondent and pettttaner centers on the "status" of 
Respondent, the second prong of the test. Respondent puts forth the following two 
arguments : 1 )  his job as a delivery clerk, which he was performing on the day of the 
accident, is a covered form of employment; and 2) since he occasionally worked for 
Maher as a checker, and subject to assignment as a checker on any day by Maher, he is 
covered. 
The Third Circuit rejected the first argument since it is well established that 
clerical jobs are not covered by the Act. Maher Terminals, Inc. v Farrell, 548 F2d. 4 76 
(3d Cir. 1 977) (holding a delivery clerk as not being covered under the Act). 
The second argument he put forth asserts the rule established in Caputo and a 
broad interpretation of the 1 972 amendments. Respondent wants protection under the 
Act because he worked as a checker half of the time and he was subject to assignment as 
a checker. He argues the court should not test whether or not at the time of inj ury he was 
not engaged in maritime activity, but instead look to his employment as a whole and 
whether he was engaged in maritime employment. 
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Maher argues that the decision in Farrell is analogous to this case because the 
employee in Farrell was also injured in an office. The Third Circuit distinguished this 
case from Farrell because unlike the employee in Farrell, Respondent actually left the 
office, whereas the employee in Farrell did not engage in activity in the pier or yard, and 
he did not act as a checker on the dock. 
Respondent cited Levins v. Benefits Review Board, 724 F.2d 4, 7 ( l  st Cir. 1 984) 
where the court looked at the "actual nature of the employee's regularly assigned duties 
as a whole" emphasizing the need to examine the totality of employee's job. Respondent 
also cited Caputo where coverage was granted to workers that spend "at least some of 
their time in indisputably longshoring operations." Caputo, 432 U.S. at 2 73 .  The Third 
Circuit also considered the approach followed by other courts, where coverage was 
granted to an employee who spent anywhere from two and a half to five percent of his 
time performing longshore activities. Boudloche v. Howard Trucking Co. ,  632 F.2d 1 346 
(5th Cir. 1 980). 
The Third Circuit found that respondent's employment was similar to that of the 
employees in Levins and Boudloche because he spent 50% of his time employed in a 
position covered by the act. The Third Circuit concluded the proper analysis would be to 
use the test in Levins requiring the court to look at the "regular portion of the overall 
tasks to which the claimant could have been assigned as a matter of course" (Levins, 724 
F.2d at 9), in conjunction with the rule from Caputo, to assess whether the employee 
works 'at least some of the time in indisputably longshoring operations." Caputo, 432 
U S. at 273.  The Third Circuit held that respondent was in fact covered under the Act 
due to the amount of time spent working as a checker in addition to his overall duties 
including the subjection to assignment as a checker even though at the time of the injury 
respondent was not working in his capacity in a maritime employee. 
Monica A. Brescia 
Class of 2005 
PROPORTIONATE SHARE APPROACH DISALLOWS 
CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS 
A defendant in an admiralty tort action who settles with the plaintiff cannot bring a 
contribution sui t against a non-settling defendant who has not been released from 
liability to the plaintiff by the settlement agreement. 
Murphy v. Fla. Keys Elec. Coop. Ass'n 
United States Court of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit 
329 F.3d 1 3 1 1 
(Decided May 9, 2003) 
Shortly after midnight on July 25, 2000, Raymond Ashman IV ("Raymond") and 
his two friends Brendan and Steven Murphy went out in a boat owned by Raymond's 
father to take advantage of the start of annual lobster mini-season. The voyage came to an 
abrupt end. The boat, piloted by Raymond, crashed into an "electric pole abutment 
support structure" owned by defendant, Florida Keys Electric Co-op Association, Inc. 
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